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Abstract 
Over the past ten to fifteen years, central banks have begun to communicate more openly. 
The article describes the Swedish central bank’s communication experiences in two cen-
tral areas: the role of real stability in monetary policy, and the interest-rate assumption 
used as a basis for the economic forecasts. One conclusion is that a higher degree of 
openness, although desirable, often makes the central bank’s message more complex. 
The communication may therefore be perceived as less clear during a transitory period. 
Another conclusion is that how open a central bank chooses to be is not an isolated de-
cision that leaves the bank’s practices unaffected in other respects. The degree of open-
ness is likely to have repercussions on the central bank’s internal analyses and decision- 
-making processes. 
“The received wisdom in central banking circles then was: Say as 
little as possible, and say it cryptically. But attitudes toward trans-
parency have changed dramatically since then, and central banks 
around the world have opened up.” (Alan Blinder, 2006, p. 38.) 
1. Introduction 
It was long a tradition that central banks' activities should be characterised by 
a substantial measure of mystery and secrecy. However, over the past ten to fifteen 
years central banks have become much more open and clear, or transparent, regard-
ing what they do and how they think.  
So what lies behind this development towards greater transparency? One ob-
vious explanation is that many central banks have become more independent in re-
lation to the political system. This greater independence has led to a requirement that 
monetary policy can be evaluated in a satisfactory manner. This in turn requires that 
the central bank is open and clear with regard to what it is trying to achieve and how. 
In other words, the increased transparency is a means of acquiring legitimacy among 
the general public – the central bank’s ultimate employer – for the higher degree of 
independence.  
However, another driving force behind this development has been that many 
central banks have regarded greater transparency as a means of more easily attaining 
their objectives and of making monetary policy more efficient. If monetary policy is 
transparent it will become more predictable and it will be easier for economic agents 
to know that the interest rate decisions made are really aimed at achieving low and 
stable inflation. A transparent and well-communicated monetary policy can thus con-
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tribute to anchoring inflation expectations and to reducing the risk that monetary po-
licy as such will become a source of uncertainty. 
Transparency is also important for the impact of monetary policy. If a central 
bank is open and clear with regard to its intentions, it can influence expectations of 
short-term rates. This means it can indirectly affect longer-term rates. Greater influ-
ence over the yield curve makes monetary policy more efficient.  
Finally, there is another type of efficiency argument that is worth highlight-
ing: The improved insight into monetary policy that results from  increased trans-
parency means that central banks are constantly forced to “be on their toes” and to 
hone their arguments and analyses. Transparency thus contributes to heightening 
the quality of the material on which the monetary policy decisions are based.  
Sveriges Riksbank, the central bank of Sweden, is often ranked as one of 
the world’s most transparent central banks.
1 However, the way there has not been 
entirely straightforward; it has in many ways been a learning process. This means 
that the Riksbank has greater experience than most central banks of problems that 
may arise when monetary policy is communicated, and of trying to find solutions to 
the problems. 
This article describes the Riksbank’s experience with communication in two 
central areas: (i) the role of real stability in monetary policy and (ii) the interest rate 
assumption used as a basis for the forecasts. Both of these areas are linked to the de-
gree of flexibility, or freedom of action, in inflation targeting. They are also areas 
where the Riksbank’s communication has occasionally been criticised. 
One conclusion from the Riksbank’s experience is that even though a high 
degree of transparency is desirable, it can sometimes be difficult to combine its two 
key components – openness and clarity. It is hard to avoid the fact that a higher 
degree of openness also makes the central bank's message somewhat more complex 
and less simple. The communication may therefore be interpreted as becoming less 
clear. Another conclusion is that how open the central bank chooses to be will matter 
not only for its ability to affect expectations on the future interest rate, but also for 
the analysis it conducts and thus its policy.  
2. A Brief Retrospective of Developments in Sweden 
To set the stage, it may be a good idea to begin with a brief review of deve-
lopments in Sweden. Sweden was one of the first countries in the world to introduce 
inflation targeting, in 1993. This occurred in connection with a severe economic crisis 
and after a long period of unsuccessful attempts to maintain a fixed exchange rate 
policy. In the 1970s and ’80s, policy in Sweden had for various reasons tended to be 
unduly expansionary and this had generated an environment that made it difficult to 
keep price and wage increases at a reasonable level. Thus, the policy regime with 
a fixed exchange rate did not serve, as had been intended, to keep inflation in line 
with the rate among Sweden’s main trading partners. Instead, the development of pri-
ces and wages repeatedly undermined the fixed exchange rate. These costs crises 
were temporarily resolved by devaluing the currency, the Swedish krona, but this did 
not do away with the underlying problem – the excessively rapid upward trend in do-
mestic prices and wages. When yet another cost crisis meant that the fixed exchange 
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rate finally had to be abandoned in November 1992 – after resolute but fruitless ef-
forts to defend the krona and break the negative trend – it was clear that fairly drastic 
measures were needed to put the Swedish economy on a sounder footing. 
The solution was a shift in the stabilisation policy regime, involving a funda-
mental reformulation of the tasks assigned to both monetary and fiscal policy. Fiscal 
policy, having previously been unduly expansionary and a factor behind the rapid 
inflation, would now be required to ensure long-term stability and sustainability in 
the public finances. 
The Swedish economy has developed quite well under the inflation-targeting re-
gime.
2 Inflation has been low and considerably more stable than before (see Table 1).
Economic growth has fluctuated less and has been stronger than in the 1970s and ’80s. 
Employment has not developed as favourably, though the situation today is consider-
ably better than in the mid-1990s, shortly after the crisis. Moreover, the combination of 
the earlier devaluation policy and an ultimately unsustainable expansion of public sec-
tor employment is commonly considered to have simply postponed the need to tackle 
the Swedish economy’s employment problems (see e.g. (Lindbeck, 2003), and (Ljung-
qvist, Sargent, 2006), for analyses of the development of unemployment in Sweden). 
A high degree of transparency is commonly considered a significant characte-
ristic of inflation targeting.
3 Indeed, the adoption of inflation targeting by some cen-
tral banks in the yearly 1990s is sometimes seen as the starting point of the interna-
tional trend towards greater transparency.
4 The Riksbank has constantly striven to 
become clearer and more open regarding its policy ever since inflation targeting was 
introduced in 1993. The bank has gradually published more and more of the mate-
rials used as a basis for interest rate decisions, while the materials themselves have 
been constantly improved. The most recent step was taken at the beginning of 2007, 
when the Riksbank began publishing its own assessment of how the policy rate will 
develop over the coming years.  
The  fact  that  the Riksbank  had  the ambition  to  be  open  and  clear  from 
the very beginning of the new inflation-targeting regime was probably an important 
TABLE 1  Mean and Standard Deviation of Inflation and GDP growth 1970–1990 and 
1995–2006, respectively 
Inflation  GDP growth 
Mean  Std.dev.  Mean  Std.dev. 
1971–1990  8.64  2.81  2.10  2.17 
1995–2006  1.31  1.00  3.01  1.54 
Note. Percentage change in CPI and GDP from the same quarter in the previous year. The old index construc-
tion for CPI is used to calculate inflation before 2005.  
Source: Statistics Sweden 
2 There is an international debate about the importance of inflation targeting for the positive economic 
developments  in  many  countries  where  this  policy  has  been  introduced;  see,  for  instance,  (Mishkin,
Schmidt-Hebbel,  2007)  for  a review  of  the research.  Few  Swedish a n alysts  would  however  question
the assertion that the inflation targeting policy has been significant for developments in Sweden.  
3 See, for instance, Svensson (2007a), who lists as the main characteristics of inflation targeting: (a) an an-
nounced  numerical  inflation  target,  (b) implementation of  “inflation forecast targeting”,  and (c) a high 
degree of transparency and accountability. 
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explanation as to why inflation expectations relatively quickly adjusted to the target of 
2 % (see Figure 1). As inflation expectations have been adjusted to the target, the dis-
tribution of expected inflation has become tighter.
5
Using this as a brief background we will now go on to discuss the Riksbank’s 
experience with communicating the inflation targeting policy. 
3. Monetary Policy and Real Stability 
One of the subjects most discussed during the period with an inflation target, 
both within and outside of the Riksbank, is the balance between stabilising inflation 
and stabilising the real economy. Is it possible to maintain low and stable inflation and 
at the same time consider how production and employment develop? The answer is 
a simple one for economists, at least in principle. When the economy is hit by demand 
shocks inflation and GDP usually rise or fall simultaneously. If monetary policy then 
succeeds in stabilising inflation, it contributes at the same time to stabilising the real 
economy. If the economy is instead hit by supply shocks (such as unexpected fluc-
tuations in the oil price due to conditions in producer countries), the balance is more 
complicated. Then the desire to stabilise inflation often comes into conflict with the de-
sire for stable developments in the real economy and it is necessary to find a suitable 
compromise between the two. 
In practice it is often difficult to know exactly what shocks will contribute to 
inflation and GDP growth rising or falling. An unexpected rise in inflation could thus 
undermine confidence in the central bank with regard to its ability to attain the infla-
tion target. A lack of confidence would in itself contribute to making it more difficult 
to attain the inflation target. 
Openness and clear communication are means for the central bank to maintain 
its credibility in that the reasons for the monetary policy decisions become easier for 
FIGURE 1  Inflation and Expectations of Inflation Two Years Ahead 
5 The standard deviation in inflation expectations among money market agents has fallen from an average of
around 0.5 during the period 1995–2000 to an average of 0.36 in 2001–2006. The fact that inflation expec-
tations tend to be better anchored in inflation targeting countries has been noted in several empirical studies;
see, for instance, (Gürkaynak, Levin, Marder, Swanson, 2007), and (Levin, Natalucci, Piger, 2004). Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                    503
the general public to understand. When inflation deviates from the target it is impor-
tant that the central bank can communicate its interpretation as to why there has been 
a deviation and can also explain what interest rate path is required to return inflation 
to the target.
6 Communication is made easier if monetary policy can be described in 
terms of simple principles or policy rules. This is one reason why central banks have 
often chosen to have explicit targets for inflation, the exchange rate or the money 
supply.
At the same time, it is evident that there are no simple recipes for how mone-
tary policy should be conducted. Central banks therefore have to maintain a delicate 
balance, not only between inflation and real economic  stability, but also in their 
communications. They have to describe the objective and stance of the policy in 
a simple manner to enable others to forecast and evaluate the policy, so that confi-
dence is maintained in the central bank. At the same time, the message must not be 
over-simplified so that interest rate decisions often deviate from the principles that 
have been communicated, as this will undermine confidence. 
Central banks’ problems are aptly described in the following quotation from 
Stanley Fischer: “Central bankers have a tendency to say that price stability should 
be the only goal of monetary policy, and to shrink from the point that monetary po-
licy also affects output in the short run. That is not hard to understand, for explicit 
recognition of the powers of countercyclical monetary policy encourages political 
pressure to use that policy, with the attendant risk that inflation will rise. But it is 
also problematic and destructive of credibility to deny the obvious, as well as to under-
take countercyclical policies while denying doing so.”
 7 (Fischer, 1996, p. 26) 
During the period with an inflation target the Riksbank’s communication of 
the balance between price stability and real economic stability has gradually changed. 
To  begin  with  the policy  could  best  be  described  as  what  Lars  Svensson  (1997) 
called “strict inflation targeting”, but it has gradually become clearer that it should be 
characterised as “flexible inflation targeting”.
8 Although the changes have occurred 
gradually, it is possible to distinguish some points in time when particularly impor-
tant changes have been made. Consequently the regime can be divided into a number 
of different episodes: 
– The simple policy rule, 1993–1998 
– Increased flexibility phase 1, 1999–2004 
– Increased flexibility phase 2, from 2005 
3.1 The Simple Policy Rule, 1993–1998 
For several years the Riksbank’s communication was dominated by a simple 
policy rule: “[…] if the overall picture of inflation prospects (based on an unchanged 
repo rate) indicates that in twelve to twenty-four months’ time inflation will deviate 
from the target, then the repo rate should normally be adjusted accordingly”.
9
6 For example, the Riksbank has in speeches and publications emphasised that the very low inflation in 
recent years was to a large extent due to unexpectedly high productivity growth and weak development of
import prices; see for example (Rosenberg, 2005) and (Sveriges Riksbank, 2006a). 
7See also (Faust, Henderson, 2004) for similar reasoning. 
8 See (Apel, Heikensten, Jansson, 2007) for a description of how the design and communication of mo-
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The simple policy rule could be justified by several different reasons. Firstly, 
it explained that the objective of monetary policy is to stabilise inflation, not, for in-
stance, the exchange rate or unemployment. In many central banks, not least Sveriges 
Riksbank, there was particular focus on inflation in the rhetoric during the first years 
after the new regime had been introduced. To a large extent this was because infla-
tion had previously been very high and variable. It was necessary to be very clear 
that stabilising inflation was the overriding objective of the policy.  
Secondly, the rule provided discipline with regard to monetary policy analysis 
and debates, both inside and outside the Riksbank. It made it clear that where there 
were different opinions as to whether the repo rate should be raised or cut, the diffe-
rent stances should first and foremost be justified by differences in the view of the fu-
ture development of inflation. Thirdly, the simple policy rule demonstrated that in-
flation must be forward-looking. It takes time before an interest rate adjustment has 
an effect on inflation, and monetary policy should therefore not be governed by the cur-
rent inflation rate, but by how inflation is expected to develop in the future. 
One reason for focussing monetary policy on inflation a couple of years ahead 
is that it allows some consideration to developments in the real economy. If the goal 
was to always bring inflation back on target as quickly as possible, it would be ne-
cessary to make substantial adjustments to the interest rate, resulting in increased real 
economic volatility. But this was not initially a decisive reason in the Riksbank’s 
communication of the simple policy rule. Instead, the time lags in the impact of mo-
netary policy were emphasised. This is demonstrated in the following quotation from 
a speech by the governor of the Riksbank in 1994: “If inflation deviates from the tar-
get, policy has to be designed to bring it back to a level which is in keeping with 
the objective of price stability. The time schedule for this is governed by the substan-
tial lag before effects of monetary measures materialize. The interval before the full 
effect of a change in the instrumental interest rates shows up is commonly estimated 
to be between one and two years. […] Policy should be constructed so that forecast 
inflation one to two years ahead […] is 2 %.” (Bäckström, 1994, p. 6) 
This quotation can be interpreted to mean that it is only the delayed impact of 
monetary policy that is important to how quickly inflation should be brought back on 
target following a deviation. There is no mention of any circumstances where the pro-
cess of adjusting inflation could be considered to take longer.
10
The simple policy rule resembles the more well-known Taylor rule, which has 
proved to provide a good description of how monetary policy is conducted in many 
countries.
11 The differences are that in the Riksbank’s policy rule there is no measure 
of the cyclical position of the economy (output gap) and that the Taylor rule, at least 
9 The quotation is from the Inflation Report published in October 1999, but the rule has been expressed in 
similar ways both prior to and after this. The exact definition of “in twelve to twenty-four months’ time” 
has changed somewhat from time to time. Most often it has been taken to mean the rate of change in prices 
between t + 12 and t + 24. Similarly, “accordingly” has no simple definition. How closely the Riksbank
has followed the rule is discussed in (Berg, Jansson, Vredin, 2004).  
10 In theoretical models where monetary policy is assumed to minimise the loss function L = (S – S*)
2 +
+ J (y – y*)
2 (where y is production and S inflation) this corresponds to a monetary policy under the res-
triction that J = 0. Stabilising production is thus not considered to be important; the inflation targeting 
policy is “strict”. 
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in its standard form, is based on the current inflation rate rather than the expected 
future inflation rate. However, as inflation and the output gap of today are important 
variables in forecasting future inflation, it may be difficult in practice to distinguish 
between the implications of the Riksbank’s simple policy rule and the Taylor rule 
respectively.
12 Moreover, the perception behind the policy rule was that stabilising 
inflation often contributes to stabilising production and employment, that is, fluctu-
ations  in  inflation  and  economic  activity  are  primarily  driven  by  demand  shocks 
rather than supply shocks. This is illustrated by the following quotation from 1996: 
“[In] the direction of monetary policy […] there is an [implicitly] built-in conside-
ration of the development of output […]. If growth becomes too high, this is liable to 
lead to inflation rising and exceeding the target. That calls for a tighter monetary 
policy. Conversely, weaker growth means […] that inflation falls below the target, 
which correspondingly calls for a more expansionary monetary policy. In this way 
we see how an inflation-targeting monetary policy aims to smooth unduly large fluc-
tuations in growth […].” (Bäckström, 1996, p. 4) 
It is worth noting that the way in which policy is described has changed some-
what. Unlike the previous quotation, it is emphasised that there is a need to also stabi-
lise real economic developments. However, the cited case is one where the central bank 
does not need to actively weigh its stabilisation policy objectives against one another, 
since the interest rate changes automatically stabilise both inflation and demand.
13
Gradually, however, the simple policy rule proved to have considerable dis-
advantages. Firstly, it is too inflexible if the economy is hit by serious supply shocks. 
There is in general no reason to believe that the forecast horizon of two years is 
the most relevant for monetary policy. If the economy suffers major disruptions, there 
may  be  justification  for  allowing  a longer  time  to  bring  inflation back  on  target. 
Secondly, the simple policy rule was based on inflation forecasts two years ahead 
under the assumption of an unchanged repo rate.
14 Such forecasts are in practice often 
difficult to make (and are therefore not made by most forecasters). If the forecasts are 
misleading, for instance by partly reflecting the most likely inflation path rather than 
what would be the result of an unchanged repo rate, the simple policy rule could lead 
to incorrect monetary policy decisions. Thirdly, the simple policy rule was of course 
not an exact description of how Swedish monetary policy was conducted. It provided 
a good description, but not an exact one. 
Despite  these  disadvantages,  the simple  policy  rule  worked  well i n  t e rm s  o f  
communication. The focus on the current interest rate decision and the inflation fore-
cast exactly two years ahead does not appear to have been perceived as too much of 
a problem outside of the bank. The Riksbank’s communication was perceived as clear 
and inflation expectations were firmly anchored around the inflation target of 2 % (see 
Figure 1). The need for changes was therefore due to reasons other than financial mar-
12 See (Jansson, Vredin, 2003) and (Berg, Jansson, Vredin, 2004) for empirical estimates of the Riksbank’s 
reaction function. 
13 In terms of the theoretical model it is not possible to say here whether J = 0 or J > 0. However, the fact 
that it is stated that there is a need for real economic stabilisation indicates implicitly that J > 0. 
14 Even though the Riksbank in its rhetoric often stressed the importance of the inflation forecast one to 
two years ahead, the simple policy rule in practice tended to focus on the inflation forecast exactly two 
years ahead. The disadvantages of the assumption of an unchanged repo rate are described in greater detail
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ket  agents  and  the general  public  considering  the Riksbank’s  communication  to  be 
inadequate.  
3.2 Increased Flexibility Phase 1, 1999–2004 
At the beginning of 1999 the Riksbank published a document on monetary 
policy which was supported by the entire newly-appointed executive board.
15 There 
were several reasons behind the need for this clarification of monetary policy. 
The most important reason was that inflation in terms of the consumer price 
index (CPI) had been below target for a period of time, despite the interest rate cuts 
made by the Riksbank. One important reason for this was that the interest rate costs 
for housing loans are included in the CPI, which means that when the repo rate is cut, 
this will temporarily, through housing costs, lead to lower inflation rather than higher 
inflation. Inflation will gradually rise as a result of the lower interest rate stimulating 
economic activity, but in the short term the development of the housing component 
will normally dominate. If a longer sequence of interest rate cuts or interest rate in-
creases is implemented, such as in the years 1996–1999, CPI inflation may not ap-
proach the target in the short term; it may actually deviate even further. 
As the change in the CPI is the best known and most used measure of infla-
tion, the Riksbank did not want to swap its target variable for an inflation measure 
adjusted for the housing component. Instead the Riksbank chose to explain that there 
might sometimes be reasons for deviating from the simple policy rule. Two such situ-
ations  are  highlighted  in  the clarification  document:  “Monetary  policy  acts  with 
a substantial time lag and the effect on inflation is largest after one to two years. […] 
Normally, monetary policy aims to fulfil the inflation target […] in one to two years. 
Departures from this general rule may, however, be warranted for two reasons. One 
is that the CPI can be pushed upwards or downwards in the relevant time perspective 
by one or more factors that are not considered to affect inflation more permanently. 
[…] The other reason for departing from the rule can be that a quick return to the tar-
get in the event of a sizeable deviation can sometimes be costly for the real econo-
my.” (Heikensten, 1999, pp. 8 and 16) 
One case thus refers to when the deviations from the inflation target two years 
ahead can be considered to be the result of various temporary shocks. The effects on 
the CPI of interest rate adjustments via housing costs are one example of such tem-
porary fluctuations in the CPI, which monetary policy does not have any reason to 
counteract. Similarly, if there are changes in indirect taxes or subsidies as a result of 
fiscal policy measures, this is not normally something that needs to be counteracted 
by monetary policy.  
The other case applies when such large deviations have arisen that the con-
sequences for the real economy of trying to attain the target within two years would 
be too large. Consideration to the real economy could lead to a readiness to accept 
deviations from the inflation target even beyond this time horizon. But this is de-
scribed more as an exception to the rule. Under normal circumstances policy would 
still be determined by the simple rule.  
The clarification was one step towards more flexible inflation  targeting in 
the sense of academic research. Its way of describing the policy implied, unlike 
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the earlier quotation above, that a conflict might arise between stabilising inflation on 
the one hand and stabilising the real economy on the other hand. This means that 
the ambition to stabilise real economic developments took on a more concrete mean-
ing for the shaping of monetary policy.
16
One  reason  for  publishing  a clarification  in  1999  was  that  a new  Sveriges 
Riksbank Act entered into force from that year. The objective of price stability (but 
not the explicit inflation target) had been written into the act and the bank’s inde-
pendence in relation to the government and the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) was 
strengthened in several ways. The changes were to a large degree motivated by 
the Treaty of Maastricht, but they were also a way of marking the political unity on 
the importance of low inflation and an independent central bank, a unity that had gra-
dually emerged over a long period of time. The new Sveriges Riksbank Act entailed 
that the Riksbank would be governed by an executive board consisting of one gover-
nor and five deputy governors, who would also make the interest rate decisions.
17
The clarification in 1999 was thereby also a means for the new executive board to 
explain how they looked upon monetary policy. 
Despite the clarification, a number of communication problems arose. These 
had less to do with the clarification itself and more with the fact that the economy 
was hit by shocks which the simple policy rule and the clarification were not adapted 
to deal with. In brief, one can say that serious supply shocks became more common 
than had been expected. 
Despite the fact that there had been no change in the inflation target, the cla-
rification in 1999 was perceived to mean that the Riksbank had in practice replaced 
CPI as the target variable with a measure adjusted for house mortgage interest ex-
penditure and the effects of changes in indirect taxes and subsidies. While the Riks-
bank was increasingly using such a measure of underlying (core) inflation in its com-
munication (an index known as UND1X), the idea behind this was to better explain 
developments in inflation and monetary policy, not to change the target  variable. 
However, many people interpreted this to mean that the Riksbank was continuing to 
follow its simple policy rule, with the difference that CPI had been replaced with 
UND1X. 
In 2001 inflation in Sweden, like in many other countries, rose as a result of 
soaring food prices. A similar upswing occurred at the beginning of 2003 as a result 
of a sharp rise in energy prices. In these cases inflation rose to 3 % or slightly above. 
The Riksbank’s assessment was that these were largely temporary fluctuations in in-
flation which did not need to be, and in fact could not be, completely counteracted 
with monetary policy measures. As the simple policy rule still had a strong position 
with financial market agents and the general public, they tried to interpret the Riks-
bank’s policy in terms of this rule but using measures of inflation other than CPI.  
16 In terms of the theoretical model, one could say that the Riksbank here describes a monetary policy that 
is characterised by a time variable value in the parameter Ȗ. “Normally,” Ȗ can be roughly equal to zero but 
“sometimes” (when inflation changes temporarily or the shocks are large) the value of Ȗ may need to be 
adapted so that it is positive. 
17 Prior to 1999 there were only two deputy governors and the interest rate decisions were not formally 
made by the governors but by the General Council of the Riksbank. In practice, however, the Riksbank
governor’s recommendation to the General Council had long been the decisive factor in the interest rate 
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The Riksbank received criticism, mainly from market analysts, for being un-
clear and was increasingly often asked the question “What index are you using 
now?”
18 The Riksbank repeated on several occasions a message that was expressed in 
the clarification from 1999: there is no individual measure of inflation that can pro-
vide a clear conclusion of how monetary policy should be conducted.
19 Even if the tar-
get for monetary policy is to stabilise CPI, the deviations from the target and the in-
terest rate decisions will depend on how large the shock to the economy is and in 
which sector of the economy it arises.  
The clarification from 1999 stated that the simple policy rule would normally 
govern the Riksbank’s actions, and that temporary shocks could arise that might in 
exceptional cases lead the Riksbank to aim to attain its target in a slightly longer 
horizon. The problem with this message was partly that severe supply shocks proved 
to be more common than it was assumed when this reasoning was formulated, and 
partly that the simple policy rule led to a discussion of the relevance of various mea-
sures of inflation rather than on the causes for inflation deviating from the target and 
what monetary policy conclusions might be drawn from this. The simple policy rule, 
which had long been of great value to the Riksbank’s communication and credibility, 
appeared increasingly to have become a straitjacket that made discussion of monetary 
policy considerations more difficult. The step towards greater flexibility that was taken 
when the clarification was published in 1999 proved not to provide sufficient scope 
for action in communications.
20
3.3 Increased Flexibility Phase 2, from 2005 
Flexible  inflation  targeting  means  that  monetary  policy  must  continuously 
maintain  a balance  between  stabilising  inflation  around  the target  and  stabilising 
the real economy. The length of time it takes to bring inflation back on target after 
a shock  depends  on  what  type  of  shock  has  occurred  (demand  or  supply  or  both), 
the size  of  the shock  and  of  course  also  the importance  the central  bank  places  on 
stabilising inflation in relation to the real economy. The Riksbank realised that if it 
wished  to  communicate  this  message,  which  is  closely  related  to t h e   m e ssage  in 
the clarification published in 1999, it would be a disadvantage to discuss temporary 
fluctuations in inflation and target deviations merely in terms of different measures of 
inflation. It is important to be able to explain how lasting the effects on inflation of 
various changes may be, irrespective of whether the changes are supply or demand 
shocks outside of the central bank’s control or policy-induced interest rate adjustments. 
If one wants to explain why an expected target deviation in a time horizon as long as 
two years should in some cases nevertheless be regarded as a temporary phenomenon 
(which does not give reason to change the interest rate or question the credibility of 
the inflation target), one may need to present inflation forecasts with a longer range 
than two years. 
18 The occasional confusion as to the precise target variable was discussed in, for example, the IMF’s 
Country Report; see (IMF, 2004).  
19 See, for example, (Heikensten, 2000) and (Sveriges Riksbank, 2003). 
20 Note that we deliberately write communication and not policy. It is far from obvious that the simple 
policy  rule  made  policy  more  difficult  in  the same  way  that  it  made  communication  more  difficult.
The policy had for a long time – for good reasons – been implemented more flexibly than the simple 
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During the years 2005–2007 the Riksbank’s communication has been changed 
in several steps: 
– In March 2005 the Riksbank published forecasts with a horizon of three years, 
based on the assumption that the repo rate would develop in line with expec-
tations in the financial markets. This was reported as an alternative scenario – 
the main scenario was still based on the assumption of an unchanged repo rate 
and extended two years ahead.
21
– In October 2005 a main scenario was presented which instead contained fore-
casts extending three years ahead. The assumption of an unchanged repo rate 
was considered too unrealistic for such a long forecast horizon, and the interest 
rate assumption in the main scenario was that the interest rate would develop in 
line with financial market expectations.
22 Forecasts for two years ahead under 
the assumption of an unchanged repo rate were presented in an alternative sce-
nario. 
– In May 2006 the executive board decided to publish a document entitled “Mo-
netary policy in Sweden”. A further step towards flexible inflation targeting was 
taken in this publication compared with the document published in 1999. It was 
pointed out, for instance, that: “normally, a well-balanced monetary policy means 
that inflation is close to the inflation target within two years while inflation and 
the real economy are not showing excessive fluctuations”. (Sveriges Riksbank, 
2006b, p. 5) 
– In February 2007 forecasts were published for the first time based on the exe-
cutive board’s own assessment of the interest rate path three years ahead that 
would give a well-balanced monetary policy.
23
Presenting forecasts for inflation and GDP three years ahead and not based on 
an unchanged repo rate, but on a realistic path for the interest rate, is entirely rea-
sonable if one wishes to conduct flexible inflation targeting. However, it is not com-
patible with a simple policy rule. Under the old rule an inflation forecast that was 
above  the target  two  years  ahead  was  a signal  that  the repo  rate  would  be  raised 
immediately (in “normal” cases). When the inflation forecasts are based on a repo 
rate path this may be a signal that the path needs to be raised. In that case, the interest 
rate may be raised more now, or later on. But well-balanced monetary policy could 
very well mean that the inflation forecast deviates from the target two years ahead. It 
is only possible to determine whether or not this is desirable if one also takes into ac-
count developments in the real economy.  
Naturally, this is a much more complicated way of looking at monetary policy 
than the simple policy rule. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the changes the Riks-
bank implemented during a relatively short period of time in 2005–2007 have been 
criticised for making monetary policy communication less clear.  
Before moving on, it may be useful to recapitulate why the Riksbank gradu-
ally abandoned the simple policy rule which had initially been such a successful tool 
for communication. The main reason was that the simple policy rule provided a mis-
21See (Sveriges Riksbank, 2005) for a description and justification of the changes made at the beginning of
2005. 
22 See Section 4.2. 
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leading description of what can be considered desirable monetary policy and also of 
the Riksbank’s actions. The clarification published in 1999 modulated the message, 
but the simple policy rule still appeared as the main principle and deviations from it 
as exceptions. The new clarification in 2006 emphasised the fact that an optimal mo-
netary policy should always be formulated with consideration to both inflation and 
the real economy. To explain why one should expect some deviations from the target, 
even when monetary policy is well balanced, the message needed to be more sophis-
ticated than the simple policy rule allowed. One weakness with the simple policy rule 
was that it did not provide any guidance as to what pace was needed for adjustments 
in the repo rate to bring inflation back to target within a reasonable period of time. 
Forecasts extending further ahead than two years and based on an assumed path for 
the repo rate (or a few alternative paths) make it easier to provide more correct expla-
nations for the monetary policy decisions.  
4. Interest Rate Assumption 
Another, and to some extent related area in which the Riksbank has gathered 
some experience through the years is communication about the interest rate assum-
ption that forms the basis for the forecasts.
24 During the period with an inflation tar-
get the Riksbank has employed three different assumptions as to how the policy rate 
will develop during the forecast period – that it is unchanged, that it will develop in 
accordance with market expectations and that it will develop in the manner the bank 
finds most probable. 
4.1 Unchanged Policy Rate 
From the time the Riksbank began to publish forecasts during the second half 
of the 1990s up until the autumn of 2005 the forecasts were based on the assumption 
that the policy rate would not change during the forecast period. The advantage with 
this assumption was that it illustrated, in a simple way, when there was reason to 
change the rate. However, there were also considerable disadvantages which gradu-
ally became more apparent, not least in the bank’s internal work.
25 Firstly, it is often 
a fairly unrealistic assumption that the policy rate should remain unchanged over 
a period of several years. Monetary policy is after all endogenous and needs to be 
adapted more or less continuously to what is happening in the economy. If the central 
bank, during a protracted period, does not react in a reasonable and credible way – 
for example, if it were to keep the policy rate constant during a sharp upswing in 
the economy with rising inflation – sooner or later problems arise, not least because 
confidence in monetary policy is undermined. Since the methods (models) used for 
forecasting presuppose that the general public believes that monetary policy will be 
conducted in a normal way, it is difficult to make reliable forecasts under the as-
sumption that the rate is held constant. 
Bearing this in mind, one can ask why the inflation forecasts that the Riks-
bank has presented in the inflation reports have not seemed more striking than they 
24 This section hence focuses on the conditioning assumption about the policy instrument in the forecasting 
process. Some central banks also make conditioning assumptions about the exchange rate. The Riksbank
has however typically (irrespective of how the interest rate has been modelled) treated the nominal ex-
change rate as an endogenous variable, along with GDP, inflation, etc.  
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have, but have generally been close to the two-percent target, even during periods 
when the assumption about a constant rate was unrealistic. One probable explanation 
is that the forecasts to some extent are based on subjective assessments by sectoral 
experts. When forecasts are produced in this judgemental way it is often difficult to 
guarantee that they actually are based on the assumption of an unchanged repo rate 
during the entire forecast period. Rather, it is probable that the economists involved 
in the forecasting process nevertheless implicitly assume that the rate will change. 
Even if the forecasts were intended to be based on the assumption that the rate is un-
changed, the forecasts that are presented in practice will therefore be based on some 
other, unknown policy rate assumption – maybe a mix between an unchanged policy 
rate and the most probable rate development. Such forecasts are not of course a par-
ticularly good guide for monetary policy decisions. 
Another disadvantage with the assumption of a constant policy rate is that it 
makes it difficult to evaluate the forecasts ex post and compare them with other ana-
lysts’ forecasts. The latter are generally based on the most probable development of 
the policy rate, which is seldom kept constant. Forecasts based on unrealistic interest 
rate assumptions can not be expected to be particularly accurate. In order to assess 
the quality of such forecasts it is necessary to adjust them in some way for the chan-
ges of policy rate that do actually occur. 
It is probably correct to say that the problems which were linked to the as-
sumption of an unchanged policy rate were perceived as more troublesome inside 
than outside the bank.
26 The difficulty of making credible forecasts based on a perio-
dically unrealistic assumption was something that was not directly and outwardly 
visible. That the assumption of an unchanged policy rate was abandoned thus had 
more to do with a need to improve the basis for monetary policy decisions than with 
criticism from outside.  
4.2 Market Expectations 
Part  of  the problem  was  solved when  the Riksbank  in  the autumn  of 2005 
switched to making forecasts based on market expectations about the policy rate, as 
they were mirrored in the so-called implied forward rates. This would however prove 
to be a fairly brief transitional solution.  
The main advantage of this assumption is of course that it is more realistic 
than to assume that the policy rate does not change during the forecast period. Thus it 
became easier to make reasonable forecasts as well as to evaluate the forecasts and 
compare them with those of other analysts. It also became easier for the Riksbank to 
present its view on the future development of inflation, GDP growth, etc. and the con-
sequences for interest rate developments. The bank no longer had to describe in 
a roundabout way the changes in interest rates that it believed would be needed in 
the future. Instead, it could explicitly say whether it perceived market expectations as 
reasonable, or whether the policy rate needed to be changed more or less than these 
expectations indicated.  
26 From the academic quarter the assumption about an unchanged repo rate was criticised; see, for in-
stance, (Leitemo, 2003) and (Honkapohja, Mitra, 2005). Somewhat surprisingly, very little criticism was 
expressed  by  analysts  on  the financial  markets,  which  suggests  that  they  generally  disregarded  which
interest rate assumptions the forecasts were based on. 512                             Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12
There are, however, certain weaknesses in making forecasts based on market 
interest rate expectations. One is that there is no clear-cut way of determining market 
expectations. Implied forward rates do not just measure expectations about the repo 
rate. They may also contain premiums that can be regarded as compensation for dif-
ferences between securities with regard to duration, credit risk and liquidity. Esti-
mating the size of these premiums is complicated and can be done in different ways. 
Furthermore, the implied forward interest rates may vary substantially in the short 
term. Consequently, the rate assumption on which the forecasts are based is fairly 
sensitive for the exact point in time at which market expectations are read. These pro-
blems mean that messages of the kind “The Riksbank’s assessment is that the repo rate 
will need to be changed approximately in line with market expectations” may not be 
as clear communication as intended.  
Another type of problem arises in those cases when the central bank has a dif-
ferent view from the market as to what constitutes a reasonable future development 
for the policy rate. The forecast of developments in the real economy and inflation 
that is published is then not the same as the one the central bank believes most likely 
and the value of the published forecast is therefore diminished. These are the same 
type of problems as with constant repo rate forecasts, although the problems are not 
as great.
As noted above, in those cases when the central bank’s view of future interest 
rates differs from that of the market, the central bank may explain how. It may, for 
example, state that it estimates a somewhat faster or slower increase than indicated 
by  the implied  forward  interest  rates.  The Riksbank  did  this  on o ccasion  during 
the relatively short period in which the forecasts were based on the implied forward 
interest rate. Apparently, the step from providing such qualitative opinions to provid-
ing ones own quantitative policy rate forecast is not very far. If one has the ambition 
to provide clear information on one’s assessment of the economy, including the fu-
ture development of the repo rate, it is hard to justify why one should not present 
the information in the form of an explicit interest rate forecast. 
4.3 The Riksbank’s Own Forecast for the Development of the Policy Rate 
Therefore, it was natural that the next step was not long in coming. In Februa-
ry 2007 the Riksbank presented for the first time its own interest rate forecast in 
the Monetary Policy Report, which had previously been known as the Inflation Re-
port. The name change was justified as the publication now included an account of 
the deliberations the executive board of the Riksbank took when it made its interest 
rate decision. Previously, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Norwegian Cent-
ral Bank had begun to publish their own interest rate forecasts (in 1997 and 2005, 
respectively).
27
One of the reasons for publishing one’s own interest rate path is that it will 
make it easier to steer monetary policy expectations.
28 With its own forecast on the de-
velopment of the policy rate, the central bank can explain clearly to the general pub-
27 The Icelandic central bank began to publish its own interest rate forecasts in March 2007. The Czech 
National Bank announced in March 2007 that it will start doing so in 2008.  
28 See, for instance, (Rosenberg, 2007) and (Svensson, 2007b) as to how the Riksbank justifies publication 
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lic and the financial markets how it envisages future interest rate developments. In 
those cases in which the central bank’s view differs from that of the market, there is 
no longer any need to take the rather lengthy detour via qualitative opinions about 
market expectations.  
If a central bank influences expectations of short-term rates, it can indirectly 
also affect expectations of rates with a somewhat longer duration. Greater influence 
over the entire range of interest rates – the yield curve – will raise the degree of im-
pact of monetary policy. After all, monetary policy is to a large degree about influ-
encing expectations – “management of expectations”.
29
With its own interest rate forecast, it is not just easier for the central bank to 
show what policy it considers reasonable. It will also make it easier to show why it 
believes in a certain policy and how it reasons when making monetary policy de-
cisions. One could say that by publishing its own interest rate path it becomes easier 
for the central bank to show not only what it is thinking but how it thinks – how it 
views the driving forces behind the economic development and the aims and effects 
of monetary policy. If the central bank is successful in mediating its view of this, 
the agents on the financial market and the general public will be able to make fairly 
accurate assessments of how new information will influence the central bank’s view 
of the future development of the interest rate.  
The fact that central banks publish their own interest rate forecasts may, in 
some sense, be said to be transparency at its ultimate: every time the central bank 
announces an interest rate decision, not only does it announce the level of the interest 
rate it has decided upon, but also what it believes will happen with the future deve-
lopment of the interest rate. However, this raises new questions. By how much is it 
reasonable that the interest rate path changes from one forecast to another? How 
much can the interest rate forecast three years from now deviate from what can be 
regarded as a reasonable long-term interest rate level? How is such a level estab-
lished? These are important questions that need to be discussed both within central 
banks  and  in  their  communication  with  the general  public.  The answers  are  not 
obvious, however, and this may contribute to the fact that published interest rate fore-
casts are not always perceived as particularly clear communication after all.  
Most academic researchers today appear to advocate that central banks pub-
lish their own interest rate forecasts.
30 However, there has also been criticism of this 
procedure.
31 One type of criticism focuses on the fact that decisions in many central 
banks  are  made by  a group  of persons.  It  has  been  claimed  that  it  is  simply  too 
difficult for a group of decision makers to agree on a forecast for the policy rate. 
The experience of the Riksbank, with its executive board of six persons, does not in-
dicate that this is a major problem. Neither in Norway, where the decisions are taken 
by an executive board of seven persons, does it seem to have entailed any major dif-
ficulties in reaching agreement on an interest rate forecast.
32
29See, for instance, (Woodford, 2005). 
30 S ee,  for  instance,  (Faust,  Leeper,  2005),  (Woodford,  2005),  (Blinder,  2006),  (Rudebusch,  Williams
2006) and (Svensson, 2007c). 
31See, for instance, (Mishkin, 2004) and (Cukierman, 2007). 
32 In New Zealand this potential problem does not arise since decisions are taken by the central bank go-
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In connection with the publication of the monetary policy report in June 2007, 
one of the Riksbank’s board members entered a reservation against the report and its 
interest rate forecast and indicated that the interest rate would probably need to be 
raised further.
33 However, this is wholly in line with the fact that the executive board 
of the Riksbank is what is usually known as an individualistic committee.
34 This 
means, in simple terms, that the members act as individuals, both in the monetary 
policy communication and when interest rate decisions are taken. The interest rate 
decisions are made through voting and the members can publicly state whether or not 
they share the majority view.
35
Another argument has been that by publishing its own interest rate forecast 
the central bank may impair its credibility. Assume that the central bank first pub-
lishes a particular interest rate path but that new information makes it necessary to 
revise this path. The central bank's interest rate decision will then deviate from the ori-
ginal path. According to the argument, the deviation could be perceived as a failure 
by the central bank and could impair the bank’s credibility.  
From a theoretical point of view, this argument does not seem convincing. Cen-
tral banks publish forecasts for a number of different variables and the general public 
and the financial markets normally do not appear to have any difficulty in realising 
that these forecasts need to be revised if the conditions change. It is difficult to see 
that this would not apply to forecasts for the policy rate.  
Nonetheless, criticism was directed at the Riksbank in June 2007 when the bank 
revised its interest rate forecast from February.
36 The Riksbank then made an upward 
adjustment to the interest rate path of more than the market had expected, which was 
reflected by reactions in the fixed income and foreign exchange markets (see Figu-
re 2). The first time the Riksbank published its own interest rate path, in February 
2007, there also appears to have been an element of surprise (see Figure 3). The mar-
ket had then expected a higher interest rate path than the one the Riksbank pre-
sented.
37
Most of the criticism has thus focused on the fact that the Riksbank’s adjust-
ment  of  the interest  rate  path  was  unexpectedly  large,  rather  than  on  the fact  it 
adjusted the path at all. It can nevertheless be said that the Riksbank’s experience so 
far indicates that adjustments of interest rate forecasts may be harder to explain and 
to gain acceptance for than other kinds of forecast adjustment. 
It is perhaps not very strange that the central bank’s forecasts are more inten-
sely discussed when they involve the publication of an interest rate path compared to 
the case when the bank only announces its current interest rate decision. Publishing 
an interest rate path means giving more information, compared to not doing so. Over 
33See (Sveriges Riksbank, 2007). 
34See, for instance, (Blinder, 2007). 
35 From the minutes of the monetary policy meetings, published with a lag of about two weeks, it is clear 
which members have entered a reservation against the interest rate decision. Moreover, in May 2007 it was
decided that the minutes should include the names of the executive board members in relation to the dis-
cussion and not merely if they enter a reservation. 
36See, for example, (Dagens Nyheter, 2007) (the largest Swedish morning newspaper). 
37In contrast, as indicated by shorter term interest rates, the interest rate decisions in February and June (in 
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time this should mean that monetary policy will be better understood, but on specific 
occasions the element of surprise may, of course, be greater. The differences that now 
and then unavoidably arise between the financial markets’ and the Riksbank’s as-
sessment of what constitutes a suitable policy obviously becomes much clearer when 
the central bank publishes complete interest rate forecasts that extend several years 
ahead.
38 There were of course differences between the Riksbank’s and the market's 
views of the most suitable monetary policy also during the period when the Riks-
bank’s forecasts were based on assumptions of an unchanged policy rate. But since 
these differences were not visible they were never discussed.  
FIGURE 2  Market Reactions in Connection with the Riksbank’s Publication of Its Own 
Interest Rate Forecast, 20 June 2007 
FIGURE 3  Market Reactions in Connection with the Riksbank’s Publication of Its Own 
Interest Rate Forecast, 15 February 2007 
38 Obviously, the differences between central bank’s assessment and those of individual agents in the fi-
nancial markets also become clearer, which may be a reason for the negative reactions to central bank’s 
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However, there is reason to believe the criticism that has occurred has in part 
stemmed from the lack of practice by the market in interpreting the Riksbank’s inte-
rest rate forecasts. As the new method of communication becomes better established, 
both at the bank and among market agents, this type of criticism is likely to fade. 
The most recent publication of an interest rate forecast, in October, did not cause any 
large market reactions. The experience of the central banks in New Zealand and Nor-
way also inspire hope. In both countries the central banks’ practice of publishing their 
own interest rate forecasts has worked well.
39
5. Concluding Comments 
In the introduction of this paper we observed that central banks now endea-
vour to be transparent and we also stated several reasons as to why transparency can 
make it easier for central banks to achieve their objectives. Transparency has often – 
not least in Sweden – been perceived as synonymous with openness and clarity in 
communication. At the same time, the Swedish experience shows that it can some-
times be difficult to combine openness and clarity. A clear message is often the same 
as a simple message. However, monetary policy must be based on complicated ana-
lyses and considerations. To explain the monetary policy in a clear and simple way can 
mean that one gives a misleading description and thus forgoes openness, as Fischer 
(1996) pointed out in the quotation we used in Section 3. 
During the first years of the inflation targeting regime much emphasis was 
placed on gaining credibility for the new policy and for the target. This was neces-
sary against the background of earlier problems with stabilisation policy. In the Riks-
bank’s communications it was emphasised on several occasions that monetary policy 
followed a simple rule. If the inflation forecast two years ahead was higher than 
the target under the assumption of an unchanged repo rate, the repo rate should be 
raised, and vice versa. This was a simple and clear message and an extremely suc-
cessful  communication  strategy  in  the sense  that  inflation  expectations  were  an-
chored on the inflation target. The fact that target deviations arose ex post did not 
shake confidence in monetary policy. External analysts were aware that monetary 
policy cannot perfectly control inflation and that there will be certain fluctuations in 
inflation around the target. 
However, the simple policy rule gradually proved to be a restriction if one 
wished to give a true and fair explanation of the formulation of monetary policy ex 
ante. There are important circumstances that monetary policy needs to take into ac-
count other than expected inflation one and two years ahead. This obviously applies 
in extreme situations such as various forms of financial crises. However, it also ap-
plies to more normal changes in the economy and inflation. Large fluctuations in food 
and  energy  prices  have  resulted  in  practical  examples  of  something  that  has  been 
emphasised for a long time in the theoretical literature: how quickly inflation should 
be returned to the target depends on what shocks have hit the economy. In order to 
deliver a simple message, it can be tempting to try to deal with this problem by fo-
cusing policy and communication on a measure of underlying (core) inflation where, 
for instance, energy and/or food prices have been removed. However, this entails 
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the risk of confusion about what the target variable is. Moreover, there is no single in-
flation measure that always indicates which monetary policy measures are desirable. 
Firstly, monetary policy always needs to take account of developments in the real eco-
nomy with regard to ascertaining how quickly inflation should be brought back on 
target. Secondly, it is not certain that the forecasts for inflation and the development in 
the real economy, given the forecasting methods available to central banks, always cap-
ture all relevant conditions that central banks have reason to monitor. Developments in 
house prices and credit volumes in Sweden during the 21st century are examples of 
this.  
This presents central banks, as the Swedish experience clearly shows, with 
a tough dilemma. On the one hand it is necessary to establish several sufficiently 
simple and clear principles for monetary policy, so that the internal work can be car-
ried out in an efficient manner and so that external analysts are able to understand, 
predict and evaluate monetary policy. If monetary policy does not follow some rela-
tively simple and clear rules, credibility can easily be lost. On the other hand, credi-
bility can also be damaged when one is forced to back down from a simplified 
message. The Riksbank’s publication “Monetary policy in Sweden” from 2006 is an at-
tempt to establish a few simple principles for the formulation of monetary policy. 
The basic ideas behind the simple policy rule are retained, but the message is some-
what modified and “modernized” – against a background of both practical experience 
as well as monetary policy theory. The message is more transparent than was pre-
viously the case in the sense that it is a more correct and thus a more open description 
of what governs interest rate decisions. Nonetheless, the message is inevitably less 
simple and clear than the old policy rule.   
Another conclusion from the Swedish experience is that there is a strong cor-
relation between communication and policy. This is not just in the fairly self-evident 
sense that central banks’ communication is an important part of their policy, since 
the communication affects expectations on the future interest rate. How open a cen-
tral bank chooses to be will also affect the analysis it conducts and thus its policy.  
Sometimes the question of openness is discussed as though it were just a mat-
ter of how open the central bank should be regarding a given foundation for its de-
cisions, for instance, whether forecasts that are used internally should be published or 
not. However, for the Riksbank an argument for increased openness has also been 
that it could raise the quality of internal work. Since the inflation forecasts are pub-
lished they can also be evaluated, and this puts pressure on the bank to develop its 
forecasting methods. In the same way, but perhaps to an even greater extent, the de-
cision to publish forecasts based on a repo rate path (first market expectations and 
then the Riksbank's own interest rate forecast) has affected the internal analyses and 
decision-making processes. When the executive board of the Riksbank decided to be 
more explicit about the way in which it envisages future interest rate developments, it 
was also necessary to have more discussions internally about alternative future interest 
rate paths. Thus the question of the balance between price stability and real stability 
also needed to be more explicitly discussed, internally and in the external communi-
cation.  This  was  followed  by  the publication  of  the document  ”Monetary  policy  in 
Sweden” in 2006 and by the bank’s own interest rate forecasts in 2007, which involves 
further steps towards flexible inflation policy in the sense of the theoretical literature – 
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response from the media and financial market agents. This is probably due in part to 
the fact  that  greater  openness  has  also  meant  that  the message  is  less  simple  than 
before. In all likelihood, it is also a question of it taking some time for market agents 
and others to grow accustomed to a new way of communicating monetary policy, just 
as it takes the central bank time to succeed in making its communication as clear as 
possible. 
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